THE LUFTWAFFE IN NORTH AFRICA (Part 2)

BF110

LUFTWAFFE ORGANIZATION
Rotte	2 planes
Kette	3 planes
Schwarm	4 or 5 planes
Staffel	from 9 to 12 planes
Gruppe	from 3 to 4 Staffeln, plus 1 Stabkette (command section)
Geschwadern	from 3 to 4 Gruppen, plus 1 Stabstaffel (command squad)
Fliegerdivision	3 Geschwadern
Fliegerkorps	Similar to a Fliegerdivision but with more planes
Luftlotte	2 Fliegerdivisionen

HAUPTMANN HANS-JOACHIM MARSEILLE

 Hans-Joachim Marseille - Der Stern von Afrika (The Desert Eagle)

OBERLEUTNANT ERBO GRAF VON KAGENECK

 
Erbo von Kageneck was born on the 2th of April 1918, in the rhenische estate of his grandfather baron Clemens Schorlemer, Lieser. Erbo was just a pet name for his rather unusual first name. He was named after one of his ancestors, Arbogast, who was a knight of Xth century.

Fallschirmjager in North Africa and the last Airborne operations in Tunisia

Ramcke Fallschirm Brigade' symbol Fallschirmjager's Symbol

Ramcke Brigade Fallschirmjager's looking for action (Colorized Picture by me)

THE LUFTWAFFE IN NORTH AFRICA

After the First World War, Germany was forbidden an air force under the terms of the Versailles Treaty. However, by 1921 a loophole in the treaty permitted many independent flying schools equipped with gliders to become established. These eventually combined to become the DVL (Deutscher Luftfahrt Verband) which issued graded licences for glider pilots. Advanced training in powered flight and on multi-engined aircraft was necessarily carried out in secret. A second complex problem was that the German aircraft industry was directed solely towards the development of civil aircraft. It could be argued that these factors combined to produce the most formidable air power of the 1930s in that the extensive experimentation in gliders led designers to develop aerodynamically advanced prototypes together with well trained and experienced crews. A third factor forced upon Germany by circumstance was that it was necessary to develop a tactical, rather than a strategic air force. This last development was a great advantage to Germany in the first two years of the war and in terms of close co-operation between air and ground units the Luftwaffe was years ahead of its time. However, the lack of forethought as to the requirement of a strategic force was to signal the end of the Luftwaffe as an effective weapon, by which time it was too late for the mistake to be rectified.